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Abstract
The idea that environmental trade policy can be used to achieve competitive advantage in international
markets has important implications for the way we conceive free trade. This paper considers strategic
environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the
traded good. Including intranational vertical relationships in the analysis of strategic environmental trade
policy has substantial qualitative effects. When vertical contracts are allowed, the optimal policy to levy on
a polluting input under both quantity and price competition in the international market is the Pigouvian
tax.

Keywords: Strategic trade; Vertical separation; Environmental policy

1. Introduction
The potential use of environmental regulations to achieve competitive advantage in
international markets is a topic of growing policy concern. As the WTO continues to tighten
restrictions on traditional government export programs, environmental regulations and other
input market controls are being increasingly scrutinized as potential instruments for strategic
trade. The OECD, the WTO, the European Commission, and other international organizations
have recently evaluated possible environmental tax reforms and their effect on national and
regional welfare and competitiveness (see [12,14]). The possibility that governments may
compromise environmental regulations to gain competitive advantage is an issue of considerable
policy importance for the way we conceive free trade.

Since Markusen [11], the potential role of environmental policy as an indirect instrument of
trade policy is a subject that has received a great deal of attention. Recent research along these
lines has developed international oligopoly models that combine incentives for pollution control
with the rent-shifting motivations for trade policy ﬁrst noted by Brander and Spencer [3]. The
balance struck between these opposing incentives has led the strategic environmental trade policy
literature to a series of negative results. Under quantity competition in the international oligopoly
market, Conrad [5] and Barrett [1] demonstrate that the optimal non-cooperative environmental
tax under-internalizes the domestic externality. Under price competition, Barrett [1] derives the
opposite result that the optimal non-cooperative environmental policy over-internalizes the
domestic externality.1 In each case, the incentive of the government regulator to fully internalize
domestic environmental damages is tempered, on the margin, by her desire to achieve competitive
advantage. This outcome, which has been coined the ‘‘environment-for-trade’’ policy result, has
been subsequently extended by Kennedy [10] to examine transboundary pollution, by Nannerup
[13] to consider incomplete information, and by Ulph [18], Ulph [17], and Simpson and Bradford
[16] to analyze the effect of additional stages of investment and R&D. These extensions modify,
but do not remove, the incentive of the domestic regulator to compromise environmental policy
for the interest of trade.
This paper challenges the environment-for-trade policy result by taking a broader view of the
vertical industry structure that encompasses the input market. We consider an international
environmental policy game that is essentially identical to that in [1,5]; however, we introduce
within this game an intranational subgame in which downstream and upstream ﬁrm(s) engage in
vertical contracts of the form considered by Vickers [19] and Bonanno and Vickers [2]. Our
analysis thus bridges some major themes in the strategic environmental trade policy and vertical
separation literatures: Regulators design environmental policy to balance incentives for pollution
control and competitive advantage, while ﬁrms employ vertical contracts that respond to this
policy design.
We model the case in which environmental regulation is levied on a polluting input while trade
occurs in an intermediate or ﬁnal downstream good. This context, which encompasses many
important circumstances of international environmental regulations, allows the potential for
decentralized contracts to emerge as a commitment device between vertically separated ﬁrms.
Bonanno and Vickers [2] consider two-part tariff contracts in vertically separated industries and
show that the optimal contract speciﬁes an upstream price below (above) marginal cost when
downstream competition involves strategic substitutes (complements). To the extent that this
contracted upstream price deviates from the Walrasian price, the vertical contract is a
commitment mechanism that plays a similar role as an input subsidy (tax) under strategic trade
policy. The essential difference is that participation by the (polluting) upstream ﬁrm is voluntary;
indeed it must be induced by the payment of a lump-sum tariff in the case of the vertical contract.
The relationship we consider between vertical market structure and international environmental
policy is important for several reasons. First, from a trade policy perspective, internationally
exchanged goods are often produced in vertically structured sectors that admit the potential for
1

These ﬁndings parallel the strategic trade results of Eaton and Grossman [6], who show, in a model without
pollution, that the trade policy which maximizes competitive advantage is a subsidy when ﬁrms choose strategic
substitutes, but a tax when ﬁrms choose strategic complements.

contractual linkages to arise between ﬁrms. Coordinated vertical relationships are known to exist,
moreover, for many important traded goods. Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebols
organizations involve linked equity interests between vertically aligned ﬁrms, and in US
agricultural markets, ‘‘backwards’’ vertical contracts between food manufacturers and farm
product producers are widely recognized as a common practice.2 Governments also coordinate
vertical markets through the use of state trading enterprises, which create separation between
domestic and international markets through payment arrangements that combine an initial
transfer price with a share of the subsequent international proceeds.3 Second, from an
environmental policy perspective, a multi-market framework adds an important dimension to
the regulatory context. The primary interface between the economy and the environment is in
upstream raw product industries, whereas the balance of international trade is in intermediate and
ﬁnal goods. Finally, from purely a modeling standpoint, suppressing the vertical sequence of
production that supports a traded good creates a policy context in which rent-shifting strategies
are external to market participants. By construction, this can signiﬁcantly alter the qualitative
implications of the model. In light of these observations, it is surprising to note that there has been
virtually no discussion to date on the effect of vertical market structure on the design of
international environmental policy.
Under circumstances in which ﬁrms engage in vertical contracts, we ﬁnd the unilateral optimal
emission policy to be a Pigouvian tax. This result, which holds under both price and quantity
competition in the international market, obtains because a vertical contract provides the
exporting ﬁrm with an input pricing mechanism that substitutes perfectly for a government
subsidy (tax) as a commitment device. Strategic distortion in environmental policy, as a
consequence, becomes unnecessary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a model
consisting of an international environmental policy game between governments and an
intranational contract subgame between upstream and downstream ﬁrms. In Section 3, we
examine the implication of vertical contracts for the non-cooperative policy equilibrium under
quantity competition, and in Section 4, we extend the analysis to the case of price competition.
2. Model structure
We frame our model around a decentralized vertical market structure that supports a traded
good. Productive activities in the sector are organized between an upstream ﬁrm and a
downstream ﬁrm in each country. Upstream ﬁrms are competitive and produce a polluting input
ðxÞ: The polluting input is used by a downstream ﬁrm to produce a ﬁnished good ðyÞ; which is
subsequently sold in an international export market. Downstream ﬁrms compete, either in
quantities or in prices, in a differentiated product market comprised of a domestic ﬁrm and a
foreign ﬁrm, which we denote hereafter with the superscripts d and f ; respectively.
2
Vertical contracts are also common in the production and distribution of coal and natural gas, in automobile and
aerospace industries, and in bulk shipping markets.
3
Hamilton and Stiegert [9] ﬁnd that the initial procurement price set by the Canadian Wheat Board generally falls
within a range consistent with the optimal contract price to achieve vertical separation in the international durum
market.

The timing of the environmental policy game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator in
county i chooses an emission tax rate ðti Þ on the polluting input, and in the second stage, the
downstream ﬁrms compete in an international oligopoly market. The second stage encompasses
an intranational contract subgame in which downstream ﬁrms can enter into contractual
arrangements with upstream suppliers that stipulate rules for exchange of the polluting input.
We consider a two-part tariff, or ﬁxed price, contract form. Fixed price contracts, which are a
commonly observed form of contractual arrangement in industrial nations, have been studied
extensively in the vertical separation literature (see, e.g., [4,19] under circumstances of quantity
competition; [2,15] under price competition).4 The terms of the contract written by the
downstream ﬁrm in country i specify a wholesale price for the polluting input, $ i ; and a ﬁxed
transfer payment, F i ; to be exchanged between the downstream and upstream ﬁrms.5
Throughout, we place no restrictions on the sign of this ﬁxed transfer.
In the event that the contract is rejected, the downstream ﬁrm in country i is assumed to
purchase the input on country i’s spot market at a price of wi ¼ wi ðti Þ: The market price for the
polluting input in country i; in turn, is governed by the level of the environmental tax in country i;
ti ; according to
wi ðti Þ ¼ wi0 þ ti ei ;

ð1Þ

where w0i is the base price of the polluting input and ei is the emissions coefﬁcient in country i (i.e.,
the quantity of emissions per unit of input). Throughout, we assume that environmental damage
is local, and that governments of consuming countries have no means to inﬂuence the policy of
producing countries.

3. Quantity competition
Let Pd ðY Þ denote the inverse demand function of the domestic ﬁrm and Pf ðY Þ denote the
inverse demand function of the foreign ﬁrm in the downstream international market, where
Y ¼ ðyd ; yf Þ is the vector of export quantities, and let C i ðyi ; wi ðti ÞÞ denote the variable cost
function of downstream ﬁrm i; where wi ðti Þ is the market price of the polluting input given by (1).6
i
i
Denoting derivatives by subscripts, we assume Cyi 40; Cyy
X0; Cwi 40; and Cyw
40; and limit our
i
attention to circumstances in which the two outputs are substitutes, Pj o0:
In the output stage, given that the upstream ﬁrm accepts the contract proposed by the domestic
downstream ﬁrm, the downstream ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt, pd ðyd ; Y ; $ d ; F d Þ ¼ Pd ðY Þyd �
C d ðyd ; $ d Þ � F d ; where $ d and F d are the terms speciﬁed previously in the contract.7 The
4

The qualitative predictions of the model would be unchanged if the contractual arrangement provided for equitysharing between upstream and downstream ﬁrms (see, e.g. [8]).
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Depending on the nature of competition, the contract may contain additional clauses such as capacity constraints
and exclusive dealing arrangements. See footnotes 8 and 11.
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For notational simplicity, all other input prices in the cost function are suppressed.
7
Sunk costs, which play no role in the analysis, are consequently omitted.

ﬁrst-order necessary condition is
pdd ¼ Pd ðY Þ þ yd Pdd ðY Þ � Cyd ðyd ; $ d Þ ¼ 0:

ð2Þ

Proceeding similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition for the downstream foreign ﬁrm is
pff ¼ Pf ðY Þ þ yf Pff ðY Þ � Cyf ðyf ; $ f Þ ¼ 0:

ð3Þ

In the event that the downstream ﬁrm in country i does not contract with the upstream ﬁrm(s),
which may occur, for instance, through compliance with antitrust laws in country i; then $ i ¼
wi ðti Þ and F i ¼ 0 in either (2) or (3).
d f
Letting D ¼ pddd pfff � pdf
pfd ; we assume the following conditions hold:
piii o0;

piij o0;

D40:

ð4Þ

The ﬁrst condition is necessary for proﬁt maximization. The second condition states that a ﬁrm’s
marginal proﬁt decreases with its rival’s quantity, which ensures that reaction functions slope
downward. The last condition is necessary for stability of the Nash equilibrium. These
assumptions imply the existence of a unique equilibrium in quantities deﬁned by the solution to
(2) and (3). Denote these equilibrium quantities
Y c ¼ ðyd;c ð$ d ; $ f Þ; yf;c ð$ d ; $ f ÞÞ:
Now consider the contract stage of the subgame. To obtain the polluting input, the downstream
ﬁrm must offer the upstream producer a contract that is (at least weakly) proﬁt increasing. At the
same time, the downstream ﬁrm will not offer a contract that earns negative proﬁt. It follows that
the supplier chosen by the downstream ﬁrm in the equilibrium contractual relation agrees to the
terms ð$ d ; F d Þ that maximize the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt subject to a constraint of nonnegative
proﬁt in the upstream market,
max Pd ðY c Þyd;c � C d ðyd;c ; $ d Þ � F d

$ d ;F d

ð5Þ

such that
ð$ d � wd ðtd ÞÞxd þ F d X0;

ð6Þ

where xd ¼ xd ðyd;c Þ denotes the quantity of the polluting input, with xdy 40:8 Recognizing that the
optimal contract terms for the domestic downstream ﬁrm leave the upstream supplier at the
reservation proﬁt level, it follows that (6) always binds. Substituting this expression into (5) yields
max Pd ðY c Þyd;c � C d ðyd;c ; $ d Þ þ ð$ d � wd ðtd ÞÞxd :
$d

ð7Þ

To ensure non-negative proﬁts for the upstream ﬁrm, a contract that speciﬁes $ d owd ðtd Þ may also involve a
capacity constraint that slightly exceeds the equilibrium demand of the downstream ﬁrm. In this case, the downstream
ﬁrm’s cost function would exhibit a discontinuity which, although not relevant on the equilibrium path, serves to
safeguard the upstream ﬁrm off the equilibrium path.
8

S.F. Hamilton, T. Requate / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47 (2004) 260–269

265

Differentiating (7) with respect to $ d and making use of Shephard’s lemma (i.e.,
d
C$
ðyd ; $ d Þ ¼ xd ) gives
f;c
@yd;c
d;c d @y
þ
y
P
¼ 0:
½Pd þ yd;c Pdd � Cyd þ ð$ d � wd ðtd ÞÞxdy �
f
@$ d
@$ d
Next, substitute (2) into (8) to get

ð8Þ

f;c
@yd;c
d;c d @y
þ
y
P
¼ 0:
ð9Þ
f
@$ d
@$ d
If the foreign downstream ﬁrm also adopts a contract, the terms of the proﬁt-maximizing contract
for the foreign ﬁrm would be symmetric to those implied by (9).
Totally differentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions from the output stage gives

ð$ d � wd ðtd ÞÞxdy

f
@yd;c Cyd$ pfff
@yf;c �Cyd$ pfd
¼
o0;
¼
40:
ð10Þ
@$ d
D
@$ d
D
Notice that the implicit structure of (9) and (10) ensures that the qualitative nature of the contract
by the domestic downstream ﬁrm is independent of the foreign ﬁrm’s choice of contract terms.
The rival wholesale price, $ f ; is an argument that affects only the magnitude, and not the sign, of
the comparative statics effects in (10).

Proposition 1. The equilibrium vertical contract for the downstream ﬁrm in country i involves an
upstream price below the regulated price of the polluting input ð$ i owi ðti ÞÞ and a positive lump sum
payment to the upstream ﬁrm ðF i 40Þ:
Proof. Suppose not. Then there are two cases to consider for the domestic country. If $ d ¼
wd ðtd Þ; then the ﬁrst term in (9) is zero, while the second term is negative. Therefore $ d awd ðtd Þ: If
$ d 4wd ðtd Þ; then both terms are negative. Therefore, $ d owd ðtd Þ; from which F d 40 follows
immediately from (6). The same holds for the foreign ﬁrm. &
By committing to pay a lower input price, the domestic downstream ﬁrm is able to increase his
oligopoly rent in the international market. In total, of course, the direct contribution of the lower
input price to the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt is exactly offset by the payment of a lump-sum transfer to
the upstream producer. Nonetheless, a lower input price alters the set of credible actions for the
domestic ﬁrm in his rivalry with the foreign ﬁrm for the international oligopoly rent. By
contracting with the upstream producer for a lower input price in exchange for a compensatory
ﬁxed payment, the reaction function of the domestic ﬁrm shifts to the right, which permits a
credible output expansion to take place in the international market.
In stage one of the environmental policy game, the domestic and foreign governments select
emission taxes to maximize their respective net beneﬁts. Let the proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrm in
country i from the contract subgame be denoted by
p* i ðtd ; tf Þ ¼ max pi ðyi ; Y ; $ i ; F i Þ:
i
i i
y ;$ ;F

The domestic welfare standard is the conventional one employed in the strategic environmental
trade policy literature in which the output of downstream ﬁrm i is not consumed within country i

and the environmental damage in country i depends only on the emissions in country i:9 The
objective function of the domestic regulator is
W i ðtd ; tf Þ ¼ p* i ðtd ; tf Þ þ ti ei xi � Di ðei xi Þ:

ð11Þ

Maximization of (11) supports the following result.
Proposition 2. If ﬁrms in country i employ vertical contracts, the optimal non-cooperative
environmental policy under quantity competition is the Pigouvian tax ðti ¼ Dix Þ:
Proof. Consider the problem of the domestic regulator. Making use of Shepard’s lemma, eq. (1),
and the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing condition (2), the ﬁrst-order condition for the
domestic regulator is
ð$ d � wd0 Þxdy

f
d
@yd
d d @y
d d d @y
þ
y
P
�
D
e
x
¼ 0:
f
x
y
@td
@td
@td

Next, divide (12) through by

@ yd;c
@ td
d

ð12Þ

and note that the linearity of td in (1) implies

@yf ðtd ; tf Þ=@td @yf;c ð$ ; $ f Þ=@ $ d
¼
:
@yd ðtd ; tf Þ=@td @yd;c ð$ d ; $ f Þ=@ $ d

Substitution from (9) results in
ðtd � Ddx Þed xdy ¼ 0:

Noting that ed 40 and xdy 40 implies td ¼ Ddx : By symmetry, tf ¼ Dfx : &
In [1,5], the optimal environmental policy under quantity competition imposes a weaker
standard than the Pigouvian level. The reason for this is that under-internalizing marginal damage
provides ﬁrms with the implicit export subsidy necessary to capture rent in the international
market. That is, the optimal non-cooperative policy in these models represents a compromise
between the opposing incentives of a government regulator to control pollution, on the one hand,
and to provide competitive advantage for her ﬁrms on the other. When production is organized
through vertical contracts, however, this outcome does not obtain.
The proposition directs attention to an important feature that is implicit in the strategic trade
literature. The presumption maintained in this literature is that the domestic regulator is capable
of capturing international oligopoly rent that ﬁrms cannot themselves acquire through their
activities in the private market. When vertical markets are introduced in the analysis, a
downstream ﬁrm is able to commit to an input price that shifts international rent through
decentralized contract design. Government export subsidization, as a consequence, becomes
unnecessary.
Models of strategic environmental policy with a private commitment stage have been
considered previously by Ulph [18] for the case of emission-reducing R&D and by Ulph [17] and
Simpson and Bradford [16] for the case of cost-reducing R&D. Apart from Ulph [18], who
identiﬁes conditions in which a regulator would over-internalize marginal damage, the ﬁnding in
9

Extension of the model in either direction would be relatively straightforward.

this literature is the conventional one that policy under-internalizes the domestic externality.
Unlike the case of vertical contracts, private commitment through R&D investment does not
eliminate the role for strategic environmental trade policy. This is because R&D investment
introduces an additional distortion in the model that prevents private and social incentives from
aligning as they do here. For example, in [17] the strategic instrument of the regulator is an output
tax, which substitutes imperfectly for private instruments levied at the R&D stage.
It is important to note that vertically structured markets do not necessarily eliminate the role
for strategic environmental trade policy. Our model implicitly assumes that vertical contracts are
allowed under prevailing antitrust laws, and this produces a bargaining situation between
upstream and downstream ﬁrms that fully capitalizes the strategic rents associated with input
pricing. If vertical contracts are not allowed under prevailing antitrust laws, however, then the
conventional strategic environmental trade policy result emerges once more. With vertical
markets, a relevant focus for analysis is the relationship between domestic environmental policy
and national (and international) antitrust laws.

4. Price competition
In this section we sketch the effects of vertical contracts under circumstances in which
downstream ﬁrms compete in prices rather than in quantities. Let Di ðPd ; Pf Þ denote the demand
function facing ﬁrm i in the international market, where Pd ; Pf are the prices set by the domestic
and foreign ﬁrm, respectively. We assume that the products are substitutes and satisfy the
d f
deﬁniteness property Dii o0; Dij 40; Dii Djj � Dji Dij X0; and piii o0; piij 40; O ¼ pdd
pff �
pddf pffd 4Dij pjij : The latter conditions mirror those under quantity competition and ensure proﬁt
maximization, upward-sloping reaction functions, and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in
prices (see [7]). Finally, we assume Dii pjjj 4Dij pjij ; which is a relatively mild condition satisﬁed
whenever the own-price effects on Di and pii are greater than the cross-price effects. Proceeding as
in the last section, we arrive at10
Proposition 3. The equilibrium vertical contract for the downstream ﬁrm in country i involves an
upstream price above the regulated price of the polluting input ð$ i 4wi ðti ÞÞ and a negative lump sum
payment to the upstream ﬁrm ðF i o0Þ:
The optimal contract under price competition takes essentially the form of the contract
considered by Bonanno and Vickers [2] and Shaffer [15]; the downstream ﬁrm contracts with the
upstream ﬁrm to receive a lump-sum transfer in exchange for paying a higher unit price for the
input.11 This is optimal because a contractual commitment to pay a higher input price by ﬁrm i
10

Proofs of all propositions are available from the authors upon request.
In contrast to the case of quantity competition, an upstream capacity constraint is not necessary here to protect the
interest of upstream ﬁrms. However, downstream ﬁrms may have an incentive to buy silently from other upstream ﬁrms
(at competitive prices) in this case. Hence, the contract under price competition may also involve an exclusive dealing
provision.
11

increases downstream production costs, which signals his rival that output will not be priced
aggressively in the international market (i.e., a ‘‘puppy dog’’ ploy). The direct effect of the
domestic price increase, of course, is exactly compensated by the ﬁxed payment; however, by
committing to pay $ d 4wd ðtd Þ for the input, the domestic downstream ﬁrm provides the foreign
downstream ﬁrm with an incentive to raise his own price in response. The foreign price increase
has a positive ﬁrst-order effect on domestic proﬁt.
The objective function of the domestic regulator is, as before,
W i ðtd ; tf Þ ¼ p# i ðtd ; tf Þ þ ti ei xi � Di ðei xi Þ;

ð13Þ

where p# i ðtd ; tf Þ ¼ maxfPi ;$ i ;F i g pi ðPi ; P; $ i ; F i Þ denotes the proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrm in
country i in the contract subgame. Maximization of (13) supports
Proposition 4. If ﬁrms in country i employ vertical contracts, the optimal non-cooperative
environmental policy under price competition is the Pigouvian tax ðti ¼ Dix Þ:
To the extent that vertical contracts are allowed under prevailing antitrust laws, there is no
strategic role for environmental policy. Under either price or quantity competition in the
international oligopoly market, the optimal environmental policy is the Pigouvian tax.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper considered a noncooperative environmental policy game between governments
under circumstances in which a domestic downstream exporter is able to form contractual
arrangements with upstream input suppliers. Our results provide sharp contrast with the
conventional strategic environmental trade policy result that the optimal tax is set below (above)
the Pigouvian level under quantity (price) competition. To the extent that vertical contracts are
feasible, we found a deviation from the Pigouvian tax in either case to be suboptimal. The reason
for this is that, apart from the pollution externality, the incentive of the domestic regulator is
aligned with her ﬁrms in the interest of shifting rent. Because the input pricing mechanism offered
by a vertical contract is isomorphic to a pollution tax as a commitment instrument, government
export promotion becomes unnecessary.
A practical implication of this result is that the optimal non-cooperative environmental policy
does not require the regulator to tax discriminate across domestic industries. This is a case of
increasing policy relevance as governments continue to seek implementation of international
environmental policy for multi-industry inputs such as NOx ; SO2 ; and CO2 : When a single
polluting input is used to produce multiple export products, our policy recommendation is to
allow for vertical contracts, to distress from export subsidization, and at the same time, to
implement environmental regulation in the Pigouvian spirit.
Our ﬁndings also emphasize an unrecognized and potentially important connection between
environmental policy, international trade, and antitrust legislation. If vertical contracts are not
allowed under prevailing national (and international) antitrust laws, then the familiar strategic
environmental trade policy results emerge once more. Future research on strategic environmental
trade policy should focus, not just on domestic pollution control policies, but on other

institutional features of governance, such as the enactment, enforcement, and adjudication of
national and international antitrust laws, that place these activities outside the scope of private
contract design.
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